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Social Sciences
Introduction
The purpose of this manuscript is 
to investigate the use of epistemic 
violence in the process of othering 
through the analysis of  empirical 
case studies. Beginning with the 
origins of epistemic violence, the 
following sections will analyze how 
key concepts of epistemic violence 
have been applied in three real-world 
cases. These case studies were chosen 
to represent three different types of 
othering: ethnic, in the case of the 
Romani people; religious, in the case 
of the Saudi Shiites; and the other-
ing of a socially-constructed group, 
presented in the case of India’s Dalit 
caste. To conclude, I argue that in 
order for epistemic violence to be 
remedied, there must first be greater 
integration of othered persons into 
the educational system. For the 
purposes of this manuscript, I define 
the ‘Other’ as the out-group: those 
that are marginalized by a larger 
portion of the population and who 
often maintain  limited rights within 
society. Epistemic, here, refers to 
knowledge and the measure of its 
validation. When discussing terms 
such as ‘epistemic agent’ and ‘epi-
stemic responsibility’, this definition 
should be taken into account for a 
thorough understanding.
 The importance of under-
standing epistemic violence is two-
fold. First, to be able to recognize 
the process of othering as it unfolds 
in societies today and second, 
through understanding the process, 
we may come closer to formulating a 
solution to combat this process and 
its outcomes. Finding a solution is a 
necessary goal in order to incorpor-
ate minorities into the greater popu-
lation, and allow them a legitimized 
voice and the status of respected and 
trusted epistemic agents – producers 
of knowledge. 
Symbolic Power, 
Epistemic Violence
 In the mid-20th century, 
sociologist and intellectual Pierre 
Bourdieu introduced the concept 
of symbolic power as it  exists in 
modern societies. For Bourdieu, this 
was a ‘worldmaking power’ (Swartz, 
1997), giving those holding the pow-
er the ability to impose their vision 
of the social world, and its divisions, 
as legitimate. From this theory came 
that of symbolic violence. Bourdieu 
understood this to be synonymous 
with ideology, as having the ability 
“to impose the means for compre-
hending and adapting to the social 
world by representing economic and 
political power in disguised, tak-
en-for-granted forms” (Swartz, 1997, 
89). Expanding on his belief that all 
actions have a purpose, those with 
social power use this power to estab-
lish and impose norms through mis-
recognition – the disguising of the 
economic and political interests driv-
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ing these practices. Stemming from 
the concept of symbolic violence is 
epistemic violence, which focuses on 
the discourse involved in the prac-
tice of othering. Othering, to this 
effect, is the marginalization of those 
who are distinctly different from the 
majority ‘us’, and uses differences 
between beliefs and customs to de-
fine them as the out-group (Rawls & 
David, 2003). Traditionally, societies 
have used the discourse of otherness 
to create a common bond within the 
in-group for example, feelings of pat-
riotism or nationalism. Often in an 
asymmetrical conflict in which one 
group has markedly more symbolic 
power, the powerful will exercise this 
power through epistemic violence 
(Maoz & McCauley, 2008). The dis-
cursively-produced sense of division 
that follows deeply and negatively 
affects the oppressed and often leads 
to physical violence and conflict.
 I have classified epistemic 
violence into three separate categor-
ies: discriminatory, testimonial, and 
distributive. Each presents a distinct 
way that epistemic violence is exer-
cised by the in-group in the process 
of othering. These categories help 
to better describe different discurs-
ive aspects of epistemic violence by 
highlighting each explicitly.
Discriminatory
 Discriminatory epistemic vi-
olence occurs primarily through the 
dehumanization of the out-group. 
In its most basic form, this is the 
construction of the Other. This often 
arises when the in-group perceives 
the out-group to be inferior, both 
essentially and morally, thus casting 
them as subhuman and thus not 
necessarily included in the majority’s 
realm of moral considerations (Maoz 
& McCauley, 2008). In doing this, 
persons are “excluded from being 
human, refused reciprocity and 
excluded from intelligibility” (Rawls 
& David, 2003, 494). Discriminat-
ory epistemic violence is often the 
first to be exercised as it creates the 
base – the Other – and is frequently 
used by those in power as a stepping 
stone to garner majority support 
for policies of separation from the 
Other. For example, the segregation 
laws that were in place to delineate 
India’s Dalit caste developed through 
political motions that deemed them 
untouchable. Seen strongly in the 
us-versus-them rhetoric of political 
leaders, this type of epistemic viol-
ence is spread through media and 
leaves, throughout history, an in-
tergenerational legacy of maintaining 
the constructed and separate Other. 
Testimonial
 Testimonial epistemic viol-
ence comes in two forms: reduced 
credibility and silencing. When cred-
ibility is reduced through epistemic 
violence, prejudice operates on the 
part of the listener to discredit the 
information they are receiving from 
the Other, despite any expertise they 
may have (Fricker, 2006). To engage 
in a successful linguistic exchange, 
the speaker must find reciprocity 
in their audience; the audience 
must understand the words and 
understand the intention behind 
those words (Dotson, 2011). The 
audience, in this case the in-group, 
effectively fails to recognize the 
speaker as a knower. Nancy Tuana 
discusses this as being “ignorance 
produced by the construction of epi-
stemically disadvantaged identities” 
(Dotson, 2011, 243), which occurs 
when groups are understood only 
by their constructed and circulated 
stereotypes. The refusal to acknow-
ledge an actor’s contributions to the 
broader epistemic community, or to 
bar them from it altogether, impairs 
their epistemic agency. 
 Silencing is discussed at 
length by Gayatri Spivak (1988) in 
her text “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 
and defined as the damage to a 
group’s ability to speak and to be 
heard. Often, this is most prevalent 
in instances of physical harm from 
the in-group against the out-group. 
It becomes difficult for a member 
of the out-group to report crimes 
when institutions are run entirely 
by the in-group. Also referred to as 
testimonial smothering, this occurs 
when the speaker from the out-
group truncates their testimony “in 
order to insure that the testimony 
contains only content for which 
[the] audience demonstrates testi-
monial competence” (Dotson, 2011, 
p. 244). Another aspect of silencing 
occurs when a group is put at a dis-
advantage because of their exclusion 
from participating in the creation of 
social meanings (Fricker, 2013). This 
exclusion makes it difficult for them 
to understand significant portions of 
their social experience.
 The profound negative 
effects of testimonial epistemic 
violence are recognized by several 
scholars: Miranda Fricker (2013) 
notes the harm that it inflicts on in-
tellectual courage; Cynthia Townley 
(2006) addresses the impairment of 
epistemic agency; and Patricia Hill 
Collins discusses the damage caused 
to the intellectual traditions of entire 
groups (Dotson, 2011). The extent 
to which entire populations can be 
denied linguistic reciprocation insti-
tutes epistemic violence.
Distributive
 It is important to recognize 
that the damage caused by epistemic 
violence are rarely confined to spe-
cifically epistemic matters (Dotson, 
2011). Often, harm spills over into 
more material aspects. Distributive 
epistemic violence refers to the re-
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fusal of resources for the out-group. 
In particular, the lack of education 
both in and about marginalized 
communities is damaging to all 
parties involved. Denial of educa-
tion can often be in the form of 
structural violence, which frequently 
accompanies distributive epistemic 
violence, as the two are functionally 
connected. The perception of these 
communities as undereducated 
only further divides them from the 
in-group and prevents them from 
engaging in and contributing to the 
larger epistemic community. A lack 
of educational instruction in a com-
mon language also serves to keep the 
out-group marginalized from parti-
cipation in society. 
 There is often also a lack of 
proper education about the out-
group; it is either inaccurate or 
absent entirely. This contributes to 
pernicious ignorance which “follows 
from a predictable epistemic gap in 
cognitive resources” (Dotson, 2011, 
238). The resulting state of reliable 
ignorance ensures that members of 
the in-group will consistently fail to 
track certain truths and to investig-
ate claims about the out-group.
 It can be said that an import-
ant determinant of state-executed 
violations of human rights, especially 
in democratic states such as India, is 
public support (Maoz & McCauley, 
2008). In modern, progressive so-
cieties, there is the question of how 
leaders are able to convince citizens 
that an entire group or culture is 
worthy of discrimination. Economist 
Edward Glaeser looks in particular 
at the propagation of group-level 
hatred as the bases for this, propos-
ing that it arises from stories manu-
factured by “entrepreneurs of hate” 
(Glaeser, 2005,  46). Most com-
monly, in-group power figures such 
as politicians and corporations, will 
emphasize stories of out-group crime 
to make them seem more frequent 
and heinous. Hatred is a primitive 
emotion which “marks for attack 
or avoidance those things which we 
perceive as a threat to our survival or 
reproduction” (Glaeser, 2005, 50). 
Its formation involves a cognitive 
process in which the evidence found 
in the propagated stories is processed 
into a belief that a person is inher-
ently evil. The cognitive error occurs 
when one takes the assumption of 
evil about a specific person, then 
applies it inferentially to the entire 
group. 
 Comparable to the adage, 
“if you repeat a lie often enough, 
it becomes the truth”, the power 
of these stories in the public comes 
not from their accuracy, but from 
repetition. Using a cost-benefit 
analysis similar to an economic mod-
el, Glaeser (2005) concludes that 
people will only investigate the truth 
behind the stories if they perceive 
private benefits in learning the facts. 
These stories are complemented by 
policies that limit contact with the 
minority, isolating them further. 
Glaeser (2005) developed a mod-
el to track this process, beginning 
with politicians deciding whether to 
broadcast a hate-creating message. 
These messages create signals to 
members of the in-group about the 
harmfulness of the minority. They 
will decide whether or not to inves-
tigate the truth behind the stories, 
then to engage in self-protection 
by supporting policies of exclusion. 
This string of events is particularly 
likely to be seen when out-groups 
are both politically relevant and 
socially segregated (Glaeser, 2005). 
This aligns with  Bourdieu’s concept 
of misrecognition (Swartz, 1997) 
as the imposition of certain policies 
relies directly on disguising them as a 
means of protecting the in-group.
To further illuminate the use of 
epistemic violence in the process of 
othering, I will discuss three spe-
cific instances in which it has been 
employed in recent history. Each 
will focus on a different type of out-
group and will analyze the use of the 
types of epistemic violence described 
above. In all three cases, the effects 
can still be seen today.
Case Study: Ethnic Othering
 The Romani people are an 
ethnic group known to many by the 
exonyms ‘gypsy’ or ‘cigány’. Col-
lectively, they make up 3 to 5% of 
the population of Eastern Europe 
and Spain. 18th century Western 
scientists have traced their genetic 
heritage to parts of northern India, 
though the Romani are traditionally 
a nomadic people. As a consequence 
of their lack of a bordered country 
or homeland, Romanis have suffered 
broad persecution and discrimina-
tion. In early modern Europe, Ro-
mani were known to be blacksmiths 
and musicians, both of which were 
‘infamous’ professions considered 
to be polluting or socially danger-
ous (Darity, Jr. ed., 2008). Their 
oppression was particularly harsh 
during the Inquisition in Spain and 
in  territories of the Holy Roman 
Empire, at which time they were 
expelled from Spain, France, and 
German-speaking countries. Policies 
in European countries during the 
18th and 19th centuries were largely 
driven by concerns that “they repres-
ented a hard-to-identify, unsettled 
population” (Darity, Jr. ed., 2008, 
278) of thieves and heretics. 
 During the Third Reich, 
their persecution intensified after 
Adolf Hitler registered the entire 
German Romani population before 
deporting more than two-thirds 
of them to camps in the occupied 
east. Seen as a genetic contaminant 
threatening the gene pool of Hitler’s 
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‘master race’ (Hancock, 2005), 
Romanis were the only group besides 
the Jews that were ordered to be 
exterminated unconditionally. Steril-
ization programs, mass deportations, 
and systematic massacres led to the 
deaths of over 100,000 Romani. This 
was between half and three-fourths 
of their total population in Nazi-oc-
cupied Europe.
 Most times, ethnic groups 
are marginalized due to a perceived 
threat. In the case of the Romani, 
this stemmed from their lifestyle. 
In many newspapers, their arrival 
has been referred to as an ‘invasion’ 
(Hancock, 2005), and their lack 
of a native country has only added 
to their reputation as outsiders, 
especially in countries where “na-
tionality is judged more by one’s 
ethnicity than passport” (Hancock, 
2005, 921). Their nomadic culture 
was thought to be representative of 
loose, transient morals. It has also 
been acknowledged that the Asian 
component of Romani heritage has 
proved to be “an overriding factor in 
the pervasive discrimination against 
them” (Hancock, 2005, 921). Partic-
ularly during what would come to be 
called the Romani Holocaust, those 
with large amounts of symbolic 
power relied on methods of discrim-
inatory epistemic violence to cast 
the Romani people as a threat to the 
greater good of society by propagat-
ing stories of their immorality and 
penchant for crime. The self-im-
posed separateness of Romanis 
further lowers the perceived benefit 
within the in-group of investigating 
these stories, and a self-perpetuating 
cycle of stigma, marginalization, un-
employment, illiteracy, and poverty 
becomes increasingly unbreakable.
 The othering of the Romani 
people is evident even in the lan-
guage used to describe them; the 
exogeneous terms ‘gypsy’ and ‘cigány’ 
are abusive and have strongly neg-
ative implications. The term ‘gypsy’ 
conjures an image of a fictional 
persona: a romanticized, wandering 
band of thieves with a penchant for 
the supernatural and fortune-telling. 
Before their genetic origins were dis-
covered, Romani were even thought 
to have come from such fantastic 
places as Atlantis, Nubia, and the 
Moon (Hancock, 2005). These gaps 
in Westerners’ knowledge about the 
Romani people were filled easily 
by politicians casting them as dirty, 
reprehensible villains in a striking 
example of discriminatory epistemic 
violence. Still today, despite the pres-
ence of two young Romani members 
of the European Parliament,  preju-
dice is evident. In former communist 
countries in particular, governments 
suffer from a type of ‘policy schizo-
phrenia’ under which ethnicization 
of public policy is encouraged across 
the board, yet the ‘Roma problem’ 
is represented as an issue of national 
security (Darity, Jr. ed., 2008). These 
governments play to the public’s 
fears of a demographic explosion of 
the minority coupled with a demo-
graphic collapse of the majority.
 Not only have they contin-
ued to be faced with discrimination, 
but the Romani people have also 
suffered as a result of testimonial 
epistemic violence in the form of 
silencing. This was of particular 
importance throughout the course 
of the Nuremburg Trials after World 
War II. Held by the Allied forces, 
this series of military tribunals tried 
leaders of the Third Reich for their 
crimes against humanity. Despite the 
large number of Romani massacred 
across the occupied territories, there 
was no recognition of German viol-
ence against them, nor were Romani 
bodies empowered to speak out for 
reparation. It is important to recog-
nize this fact, as it is vital that “in-
stitutional bodies to whom citizens 
may need to contest must, on pain 
of facilitating domination, achieve 
epistemic justice in their hearings” 
(Fricker, 2013, 1326).
Case Study: Religious 
Othering
 In the Middle East, many 
conflicts are based on the stark 
division between Sunni and Shia 
Muslims. This ancient religious 
divide has been the fuel behind a 
resurgence of clashes in Muslim 
countries. Struggles between Sunni 
and Shia forces powered a Syrian 
civil war that threatens to alter the 
regional map, spurred violence that 
is shattering Iraq, and widened frac-
tures in a number of Gulf countries. 
Growing sectarian conflicts have 
also stimulated the revitalization of 
transnational jihadi networks that 
pose a threat to the global political 
sphere. Islam’s schism, seething for 
fourteen centuries, is an issue that 
has arisen again and again. Though 
in several Muslim nations there is a 
Shia majority, they make up only 10 
to 15% of the population of Saudi 
Arabia. As the minority, they face 
discrimination under the absolute 
monarchy that has ruled the country 
since its establishment.
 Saudi Arabia is often thought 
to be the leader of the Sunni world 
as a religious state which derives 
its legitimacy from a form of Islam 
which is almost definitively an-
ti-Shiite, and throughout history, 
the “Shiites have paid the price of 
the Saudi family’s quest for religious 
legitimacy” (Teitelbaum, 2010,  2). 
Wahhabi and Salafi ideology teaches 
an intolerance of any other interpret-
ations of Islam and therefore refuse 
to bless any greater integration of 
Shiites into religious and political 
society (Beranek, 2009). The pro-
clamations of radical clerics have cast 
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Shiites as polytheists and non-believ-
ers. In the 18th and 19th centuries, 
Shia persecution reached a climax 
when many important religious 
shrines were destroyed by Sunni 
Muslims in the cities of Mecca and 
Medina (Commins, 2006). In the 
early 20th century, zealous warriors 
of the Ikhwan insisted that Wahhabi 
ideals should prevail in domestic 
politics and forced conversion of 
many Shiites. Shia religious leaders 
were gathered and vowed to cease 
observance of Shia religious holidays, 
shut down their places of worship, 
and stop pilgrimages to holy sites 
(Commins, 2006). 
 Though in reality the minor-
ity does not pose a threat to the 
Saudi state, their treatment is greatly 
influenced by the recent rise of Iran 
and Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon. 
The Saudi government fears this will 
empower their own Shia popula-
tion. Pressure from Wahhabi ulama 
serve only to further this as they lead 
clerics to publish anti-Shiite fatwas, 
sanctioning their killing (Teitel-
baum, 2010). Along with the pres-
ence of Shiites in some oil-rich areas, 
the two sects coexist in a climate of 
asymmetric violence in Saudi Arabia 
in which there is increased support 
within the stronger party for retali-
atory aggression against that which 
is more vulnerable. The perceived 
threat of a Shia uprising is cause for 
support of aggressive and belligerent 
retaliatory policies, as is often the 
case when there is an alleged col-
lective threat (Maoz & McCauley, 
2008).
 The official statement given 
by the Saudi government posits that 
while they do not believe Shiites 
should be killed, expelled, or con-
verted by violence, they should 
“renounce their fallacious beliefs 
voluntarily and embrace the right 
path of Islam” (Beranek, 2009, 5). 
After their forced conversion by the 
Ikhwan, Wahhabi ulama took over 
teaching and preaching positions 
at the remaining Shia mosques, 
and so the dogma of polytheistic, 
non-believing Shiites has for many 
years been a part of official school 
curriculum (Teitelbaum, 2010). 
In this way, the othering of Shia 
Muslims continues to be discursively 
produced through the construction 
and propagation of knowledge in 
the educational system under all 
three methods of epistemic violence. 
Because of the influence that this 
has had on many generations of 
students, Shia Muslims continue to 
be the victims of violence, attacks, 
mass killings, bombings, and the 
destruction of homes and religious 
shrines. They remain discriminated 
against in the workforce and have 
very little socio-economic mobility. 
We can also see an erosion of many 
Shia epistemic traditions over time 
due to the silencing of their religious 
practices and teachings.
Case Study: Othering of a 
Socially Constructed Group
 Not all out-groups are as 
easily classified as the Other based 
on differences in ethnicity or reli-
gion; there exist groups which are 
outwardly much the same as the ma-
jority, yet still face persecution as the 
out-group. One widely applied and 
frequently contested model for sys-
tems of birth-attributed rank is that 
of caste, originating from the ex-
ample unique to India where the jati 
is the standard for societal division. 
Jati in India refers to interdependent, 
hierarchical, birth-attributed groups. 
This socially-stratified system divides 
communities into hereditary groups 
and has long been considered to 
be “one of the pillars of the Hindu 
social order in India” (Lerner, Lerner 
& Lerner, 2006, 396). Important 
to this system are the concepts of 
purity and pollution, which govern 
intrapersonal relationships includ-
ing food, occupation, marriage, and 
religious rituals. 
 Under this hierarchical sys-
tem, the upper castes are privileged 
and rewarded, while the lowest caste 
– Dalit – are excluded from their 
surrounding communities. During 
their colonial rule, the British took 
advantage of this system, imposing 
policies which favored the upper 
castes and solidifying its power over 
Indian society (Iyer, 2009). It was 
primarily during the 19th century 
that Dalit began to be referred to as 
‘Untouchables’, at which time they 
were denied basic civil rights and 
subjected to atrocities (Lerner et. 
al., 2006). They were also banned 
from many public spaces, includ-
ing temples, and prohibited from 
interaction with members of higher 
castes. 
 In the 20th century, In-
dia saw Dalit movements for caste 
reform, and untouchability was abol-
ished in the Indian Constitution in 
1950 under the secular democratic 
republic (Iyer, 2009). However, the 
caste system has not yet been eradi-
cated and remains deeply ingrained 
in society today. In 1999, the Hu-
man Rights Watch reported that 
over 160 million Dalit faced severe 
discrimination and were still being 
denied basic human rights such as 
access to drinking water, educa-
tion, and jobs (Lerner et. al.). There 
has been a rise in violence despite 
anti-untouchability acts and the 
government’s official commitment 
to equality. Cultural critic Rustom 
Bharucha discusses the system’s 
continuing presence in modern 
society, “For whom is it possible to 
elide the stigmas attached to a low 
caste genealogy, heredity-determined 
occupation, poverty, social ostracism, 
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and untouchability? These markers 
of dalit identity continue to deep-
en even as the politics around this 
identity are in the process of being 
problematized and internationalized” 
(Bharucha, 2003, 4240).
 The historic othering of 
Dalit is apparent even in the etymo-
logy of the term. Dalit can be traced 
to the ancient language Sanskrit, in 
which dal means to split or crack. 
Dal in Hebrew means something 
low, weak, and poor (Lerner et. al., 
2006). They are victims of discrim-
inatory epistemic violence through 
dehumanization as they are per-
ceived to be subhuman and are the 
targets of feelings of disgust and 
contempt. A study run by social 
psychologists Ifat Maoz and Clark 
McCauley (2008) found that “dehu-
manization is an instigator of sup-
port for interethnic violence” (105). 
Even within a society which endorses 
democratic norms, the historic 
discourse emphasizing out-group 
dehumanization has continued to 
legitimize aggression against the 
vulnerable. 
 The Indian government is 
reaching out to the Dalit in at-
tempts to integrate them into society 
through a policy of affirmative ac-
tion. However, the epistemology of 
violence is so profoundly entrenched 
in societal thought and discourse 
that higher castes are morally op-
posed to this policy, claiming that 
it propagates reverse discrimination 
(Iyer, 2009) and that it will lead to 
brain drain as intellectuals leave the 
country (Lerner et. al., 2006). Dalit 
are victims of all three types of epi-
stemic violence and until the public 
discourse can change to include 
Dalit voices as legitimate contribut-
ors, India will remain stratified. 
Conclusion: Non-Oppressive 
Ways of Knowing
 I have presented but three 
examples of how the practice of 
epistemic violence has been used to 
construct and maintain the Other. 
Despite growing awareness and 
support for the marginalized groups, 
the idea of the Other has been 
generationally ingrained in societal 
epistemologies. In order to reverse 
these fixed ideas, communities must 
actively engage in the development 
of non-oppressive ways of knowing 
persons across different ethnicities, 
religions, genders, and social posi-
tions. Feminist theory of epistem-
ology recognizes the need for the 
awareness of the ‘epistemic respons-
ibility’ (Townley, 2006) held by both 
the individual and groups in order 
to overthrow the oppressive ways of 
knowing that have been and are still 
globally present. Those who ascribe 
to this theory would suggest that 
epistemologists need to take more 
seriously issues of group differences 
because the social hierarchies that 
they often encourage can “both limit 
the spheres of action available to 
agents from non-privileged groups 
and discourage those from privileged 
groups from being accountable for 
their actions when they seek and 
claim knowledge” (Townley, 2006, 
40).
 While Francesco Caselli and 
John Coleman suggest that ethnic 
conflict automatically accompanies 
visible group differences (Glaeser, 
2005), I would argue that hatred 
also arises between groups that 
closely resemble each other, such as 
between the upper and lower castes 
in India. To this end, what is vital to 
ending hatred between both visibly 
different and visibly similar groups is 
integration. As stated above, Glaeser 
(2005) rightly posits that people will 
investigate the truth behind propag-
ated stories if there is the perception 
that they will benefit from putting 
forth the effort. Greater integration 
between groups could effectively de-
ter the spread of hatred by creating a 
demand for the correct information 
and reducing the cost of searching 
for it. The existence of group dif-
ferences, instead of being used as a 
crutch for marginalization, must be 
used to justify extending the benefit 
of the doubt (Rawls & David, 2003) 
by giving these differences legitimacy 
in their own right.
 Often, those uninformed 
will argue that minorities tend to 
other themselves on the basis of 
racial consciousness – failing to 
recognize that this self-segregation is 
generally the product of pre-existing 
and historic patterns of discrimina-
tion (Bharucha, 2003). In the case 
of the Romani, the self-imposed sep-
arateness comes not just from their 
cultural beliefs, but also, and much 
more prominently, from their his-
tory of slavery in the 16th through 
19th centuries and policies of social 
distancing established by their 
European host societies (Hancock, 
2005). It is evident, especially in 
the example of the Romani people, 
that “when people are systematically 
excluded, or rendered in subordinate 
roles, they are forced to erect bound-
aries of their own to create protected 
situations that offer them the possib-
ility of mutual reciprocity and trust 
within those boundaries” (Rawls 
& David, 2003, 471). This creates 
a serious problem for democratic 
societies in particular, as persons are 
excluded from situated interactions 
essential for the overall development 
of a country’s economic, political, 
and social transactions (Rawls & 
David, 2003).
 Though modern societies, 
through technological advance-
ments, are becoming increasingly 
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engaged and cohesive, old notions 
of the segregated Other are still 
prevalent through discourse and 
generational education. It is for this 
reason that integration must start 
in the education systems. Draw-
ing once again on Glaeser’s (2005) 
cost-benefit analysis, if education 
reduces the cost of learning the 
truth, then less-educated individu-
als will have a higher likelihood of 
accepting false hate-creating political 
stories. There is a need for educators 
to make use of post-structuralist 
perspectives pioneered by Michel 
Foucault, among others, in order to 
address the diversity and situatedness 
of oppression through teaching and 
learning (Kumashiro, 2000). Pres-
ident of the National Association 
for Multicultural Education, Kevin 
Kumashiro (2000), defines two types 
of knowledge which are harmful to 
the Other. The first is knowledge 
about only what society’s majority 
defines as ‘normal’ and ‘normative’. 
This causes what constitutes oth-
erness to be known only by infer-
ence and comparison, which leads 
to misconceptions. The second is 
knowledge about the Other which 
encourages a “distorted and mislead-
ing understanding of the Other that 
is based on stereotypes and myths” 
(Kumashiro, 2000, 32). In response, 
he suggests the first approach to 
addressing oppression is to improve 
the experiences of those who are 
othered through their inclusion in 
the educational system. Many times, 
the harm is not in the propagation of 
biased knowledge but in an inaction 
entirely. Kumashiro (2000) notes 
that a number of researchers have 
documented shockingly substandard 
conditions in the educational insti-
tutions serving marginalized groups, 
including unsafe buildings and 
insufficient instructional material. 
I would also argue that along with 
their integration into the education 
systems, the marginalized students, 
along with in-group students, need 
to be provided with unbiased know-
ledge about the Other, and about the 
legitimacy of different cultural prac-
tices. Education must also be used 
to make available to the out-group 
the language of self-representation. 
This will allow them the possibility 
of contestation, which is required for 
non-domination (Fricker, 2013).
 Overall, there needs to be an 
effort made to cultivate an envir-
onment of responsible trust. This 
implies that all epistemic agents 
are treated with appropriate respect 
(Townley, 2006). However, we must 
assure that this is not taken ad-
vantage of by politicians and other 
entrepreneurs of hate; we must avoid 
exercising responsible trust blindly in 
these situations. As a global society, 
we need to start a new discourse 
about the causes and results of epi-
stemic violence. It is time to progress 
past historic prejudices and protect 
minorities from the damages done 
by othering. They must be given the 
right, as epistemic agents, to legitim-
acy in their practices and methods of 
thought. 
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